Have a read!

I received the following article in my mail from a friend. I don't know who has written it. I am interested in knowing your opinions on it though.


When hearing Nadim Bashir Gemayel's voice, we are
automatically reminded of the brave leader, Bashir Gemayel, and an
era of Christian strengths, unity and pride. However, after the
nostalgia subsides, a serious question arises. Can Nadim truly bring
back the "hope" lost with the death of his father in 1982?
In order to reach a comprehensive and logical answer, we must
compare our conditions today to that of the conditions and days of
Bashir Gemayel. First, in 1975, when Bashir began his political and
military venture, the Christians and Lebanon were under Syrian and
Palestinian constant bombardment. These attacks threatened the
survival of the Christians and the existence of the Lebanese State.
Ordinary people were being kidnapped, raped, and killed and their
fortunes and livelihoods were being destroyed on a daily basis.
Accordingly, the entire Christian community stood behind the Kataeb
Party, and in one way or another, backed Bashir who was leading the
resistance from within the Kataeb/LF. He was head of the Kataeb
Security Council, (El-Majlis El-Harby) and Vice President of the
Kataeb Ashrafieh District. Later on, after the liberation war of Tel
Zaatar, he was appointed to lead the newly created Lebanese Forces,
which became the Kataeb military arm. Bashir's position earned him
the full support of Sheik Pierre Gemayel and the Kataeb Party, as
well as the utmost backing of the Lebanese Front. Afterward, when
Bashir launched his political career, he had already succeeded in
many military victories, which proved his trustworthiness as well as
his leadership skills. Therefore, opposing Bashir at that time meant
opposing the entire Christian community and the sovereignty of
Lebanon.
In today's Nadim's case, the situation is much different.
Despite the Syrian's grip over Lebanon, many do not believe that
Lebanon's existence is threatened, (at least it doesn't appear that
way to ordinary people.) Furthermore, despite the oppression imposed
by their Syrian/Lebanese Mokhabarat, the Lebanese cities and towns
are not being bombed by the Syrian and Palestinian artilleries.
Moreover, the Christians are not being kidnapped, raped, or killed in
broad light situations. Therefore, as a community, the Christians do
not sense a clear and present danger. In fact, many Christians feel
safe and protected, while the threat against the rest is related to
their political affiliation instead of their religious one.
Therefore, the Christians deem the situation acceptable since it does
not constitute a threat, which requires harmony and collective
measures for resistance. Hence, their unity is absent and the need to
support a leader like Nadim is considered unnecessary. Furthermore,
Nadim does not have any military victories or experience, and he does
not have any resistance sacrifices. Therefore, veterans of the
Lebanese war, who are much older than Nadim, do not relate to him as
a military colleague and, therefore, they do not accept or expect his
leadership. To these veterans, Nadim is the son of their friend
Bashir whom they love and admire-no less no more. They do not view
him as the heir of Bashir, the leader or the hope. In addition, as
mentioned earlier, Bashir began his leadership by confronting the
real enemies of Lebanon and the Lebanese people, while Nadim is
launching his career by confronting his own people in a small, and
most probably, losing battle in the Baabda/Aley bi-election. Since
this bi-election does not concern most Christians, at least not
directly, and since the portrayed enemy of this battle is neither the
Palestinians nor the Syrians, most Christians feel uncommitted to
back Nadim in this minor cause. After all, the rival that Nadim is
opposing and fighting is none other than the Lebanese Maronite, Henry
Helou. Obviously, Mr. Helou poses no threat to the Christians or to
the sovereignty of Lebanon. Meanwhile, his opposition, Aoun's
candidate, Mr. Hikmat Deeb, that Nadim is supporting, does not hold
the key to liberating the country from the Syrian oppression and
occupation. Thus, Nadim's rally for support is not a life or death
situation as in the war on Ashrafieh or Zahleh, which concerned most,
if not all, Christians and which required their unity and support to
Bashir.
Another important point is Nadim's unexpected support of Aoun
in the baabda/Aley bi-election, which occurred without any
consideration to the stance of his family and colleagues. This
behavior has become a question of trustworthiness. After all, Aoun,
who launched a war of elimination against Bashir's organization in
1990, is now launching a similar one against Bashir's own family.
Despite this fact, Nadim is supporting Aoun. In addition, unlike
Bashir who was fighting the enemies of Lebanon, Nadim seems to have
begun his "war" against his own family and colleagues. This is
certainly the wrong target. Many colleagues have viewed such an act
as a betrayal, while many others thought of Nadim as a loose canon.
Nadim's irrational and inexplicable behavior will definitely backfire
at him in the future.
Joining alliances is a normal political activity. However,
this does not apply to Nadim's support to Aoun. As a young
inexperienced man in his first political public appearance, Nadim
failed to portray himself as a leader equal to Aoun. This was obvious
in the Kahaleh and Hadath rallies where Nadim spoke as one of Aoun's
supporters. He presented himself like a follower rather than an
independent leader with a distinguished character and a significant
political agenda; a serious leadership flaw. As well, Nadim has
created animosity and rivalry when he implicitly criticized prominent
members of the opposition group of Qornet Shehwan. In this case,
Nadim acted as the "puppet" that Aoun manipulated to strike inside
the Gemayel family as well as the opposition. Allowing Aoun to use
him is a serious critical thinking flaw on Nadim's part, which will
complicate his political path, especially since he has no position in
the Kataeb or in the LF parties to help him stand his ground. In
fact, Nadim is simply an ordinary young man who is cashing in on the
inherited credentials, achievements, and legacy of his father. This
credit may have opened the door for him but it will not take him up
the ladder of success unless he proves himself liable and worthy of
people's trust. Otherwise, this inherited political credit will soon
wear out, and the renewed "hope" will turn into a disappointment.
It is certain that Nadim's "faut pas" is the result of bad
advice given by bad advisors. He was rushed to launch his political
career at the wrong time in the wrong place, and from the wrong
platform aiming at the wrong target/s. In order for the young man to
correct his mistake, it is essential that he disappears from the
political scene at least until the elections of 2005. Then, he should
reappear at the true platform of the resistance, in which his
grandfather started and for which his father was martyred. Behind
him, Nadim should make sure that his family and true friends stand,
while above them all, a large picture of Sheikh Pierre and sheik
Bashir hangs. Last but not least, Nadim should make sure to receive
the advice from his uncle; the veteran, and the most internationally
recognized diplomat, President Amine Gemayel, who after all secured
the election of his father. This is the true platform of resistance.
This is the proper place for him to stand. Most certainly, this is
the appropriate stage from which his tale should begin-right where
his father's story ended. Otherwise, Nadim, whose trustworthiness and
rational thinking is now questionable, will fall through the same
crack, in which his cousin Paul Gemayel fell.
Notwithstanding, if the Pope, the US administration, the
Europeans, the Russians and the Arabs find a great value in
discussing issues with President Amine Gemayel, shouldn't young and
inexperienced Nadim?

posted by Rampurple @ 9/08/2003 01:07:00 PM

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